The court in Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 400, recounted a portion of the legislative history in order to explain the statute’s purpose: “An analysis prepared for the Senate Committee on Judiciary (1977- 1978 Reg. Sess.—Assem. Bill No. 3093) saw the purpose as follows: ‘Under existing law, a victim of harassment may bring a tort action based either on invasion of privacy or on intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Where great or irreparable injury is threatened, such victim may obtain an injunction under procedures detailed in C.C.P. Sec. 527(a). [¶] This bill would establish an expedited procedure for enjoining acts of “harassment” as defined, including the use of temporary restraining orders. . . . [¶] The
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purpose of the bill is to provide quick relief to harassed persons.’ ” (Id. at p. 405.) It
follows that if there is no likelihood of future harm, there is no necessity for an expedited
procedure for relief. Indeed, under subdivision (d) a court cannot issue an injunction
unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “unlawful harassment exists” (§
527.6, subd. (d), italics added), not that it existed in the past.